




























































































Monetary policy is inevitably conducted under considerable uncertainty about the state of the
economy and the nature of recent disturbances, and analyses of optimal policy that take no ac-
count of this are therefore of doubtful practical utility. However, in the case of purely backward-
looking models of the kind exclusively used by central banks prior to the 1990s, powerful general
principles for ecient estimation of the state of the economy and for determining the optimal
use to make of such estimates have been well-understood since at least the 1970s. In the case
of a linear economic model, a quadratic loss function for the policymaker, and uncertainty only
about the state of the economy (that is, the current values of certain additive terms in the
economic model), a principle of certainty equivalence applies: the optimal policy is the same as
if the state were fully observable, except that one responds to an ecient estimate of the state
vector rather than to its actual value. Furthermore, a separation principle applies, according to
which the determination of the optimal response coecients to be applied to one's estimate of
the state of the economy (the optimization problem) and the estimation of the current state of
the economy (the estimation or signal-extraction problem) can be treated as separate problems.
The optimal response coecients are independent of the specication of the central bank's in-
complete information; and the optimal weights to place on alternative indicators in estimating
the state vector are independent of the central bank's objective function.1
This paper contributes to a program (initiated in Svensson and Woodford [12]) that seeks
to determine the extent to which similar methods may be applied in the context of the sort
of forward-looking models that are now widely used by central banks in policy simulations.
Forward-looking models | that is, models in which the state of the economy is determined,
among other factors, by expectations regarding the economy's future state | raise non-trivial
complications not contemplated in the standard treatments of the 1970s. In [12], we consider
a general class of linear-quadratic models, in which the private sector and the central bank
a r ea s s u m e dt oh a v et h esame partial information about the state of the economy. In this
special case, we are able to establish that both certainty equivalence and a separation principle
still obtain, when properly interpreted. We furthermore exhibit useful general formulas for
computation of the optimal policy response coecients and ecient estimates of the state of the
economy in the context of a forward-looking (rational-expectations) model.
In the present paper, we instead consider the additional complications that arise in the
1 Important early treatments include Chow [3], Kalchbrenner and Tinsley [5], and Leroy and Waud [6].
1case of a particular type of asymmetry between the information available to the central bank
and that available to the private sector. The general problem of optimal policy in the case
of asymmetric information appears to be quite dicult, so we here restrict our analysis to a
particular, relatively simple case, that is nonetheless of considerable interest.2 This is the case
in which the private sector has complete information about the current state of the economy,
while the central bank observes only a particular set of indicators, which are also contaminated
by \noise" that is unrelated to the fundamental determinants of the state variables that matter
for its optimization problem.
One may or may not believe that central banks typically possess less information about the
state of the economy than does the private sector. However, there is at least one important
argument for the appeal of this assumption. This is that it is the only case in which it is
intellectually coherent to assume a common information set for all members of the private sector,
so that the model's equations can be expressed in terms of aggregative equations that refer to
only a single \private sector information set," while at the same time these model equations
are treated as structural, and hence invariant under the alternative policies that are considered
in the central bank's optimization problem. It does not make sense that any state variables
should matter for the determination of economically relevant quantities (that is, relevant to
the central bank's objectives), if they are not known to anyone in the private sector. But if all
private agents are to have a common information set, they must then have full information about
the relevant state variables.3 It does not follow from this reasoning, of course, that it is more
accurate to assume that all private agents have superior information to that of the central bank;
it follows only that this case is one in which the complications resulting from partial information
are especially tractable. The development of methods for characterizing optimal policy when
dierent private agents have dierent information sets remains an important topic for further
research.4
In this paper, we characterize both (Markov-perfect) equilibria in which the central bank op-
timizes under discretion and the optimal policy under commitment, giving particular attention
2 Examples of recent applications of the kind of general analysis oered here to particular problems include
Aoki [1], [2] and Dotsey and Hornstein [4]. The appendix to [4] independently derives some of the results presented
in section 2 below for the case of discretionary policy, building upon the analysis in Svensson and Woodford [12]
as we do. Here we also treat the more dicult case of optimal policy under commitment.
3 The kind of optimal policy problem treated in [12] is therefore not one for which rigorous microfoundations
can be supplied. Relations such as the Lucas [7] aggregate supply equation, which appear to be of the form
considered in that paper, are actually not fully structural; for they involve coecients that are not invariant to
changes in the policy regime, as Lucas stresses.
4 Important early studies that develop methods for characterizing rational expectations equilibria in which
dierent private agents have dierent information sets include Townsend [14] Pearlman [9], and Sargent [10].
2to the optimal ltering problem of the central bank in each case. Our main results are parallel
in both cases. We establish a certainty-equivalence principle once again: optimal instrument
settings satisfy a feedback rule in which the coecients (describing optimal central-bank re-
sponses to the bank's estimates of the state of the economy) are independent of the nature of
the bank's partial information (though the estimates that the bank responds to depend upon
this). On the other hand, we cannot obtain a separation principle of the sort obtained in the
full information case, or in the case of symmetric partial information treated in [12]. The central
bank's optimal estimates of the unobserved state variables (used as inputs to the feedback rules
just described) are in general not independent of the objective function that it seeks to minimize.
Furthermore, the complete equilibrium evolution of the state of the economy, given the path
of the central bank's estimates, can no longer be derived independently of the specication of
the bank's partial information and hence of the lter that it uses to derive its estimates. In
this respect, asymmetric information results in complexities that do not arise in the case of
symmetric partial information.
In section 2, we set out the class of linear-quadratic models with which we are concerned,
and then consider optimization under discretion. Section 3 presents corresponding results for
the case of optimal policy with commitment. Finally, section 4 illustrates how our framework
applies to the optimal policy problem considered by Aoki [1] and [2].
2 Optimization under discretion
We begin with an exposition of the general linear-quadratic framework that we assume through-
out this paper, and then characterize optimizing policy under discretion.
2.1 The framework
We consider a linear model of an economy, in which a vector of state variables are determined by
a system of structural equations intended to represent the conditions for rational-expectations
equilibrium given optimizing private-sector behavior. We do not explicitly describe the op-
timization problems of private agents that underlie these equations, but we note that such
optimization results in the presence of forward-looking terms (that is, conditional expectations)
in the structural equations, and we take care to specify the common information set of all agents
in the private sector, with respect to which these conditional expectations are dened. The op-
timization problem of the central bank (or more generally, the policymaker) is instead described
3explicitly; in this problem the structural equations resulting from private-sector optimization
appear as constraints. We also take care to specify the information set of the central bank,
which diers from that of the private sector.

























where Xt is a vector of nX predetermined variables in period t, xt is a vector of nx forward-
looking variables, it is (a vector of) the central bank's ni policy instrument(s), ut is a vector of nX
iid shocks with mean zero and covariance matrix uu,a n dA, B and ~ E are matrices of appropriate
dimension.5 The nxnx matrix ~ E (which should not be confused with the expectations operator
E[]) may be singular (this is a slight generalization of common formulations in which ~ E is the
identity matrix).
We let Etz denote the rational expectation (the best estimate) of any variable z in period
,given private-sector information in period t. We will assume that the private-sector has full
information, I
f
t ,s oE tz  E[zjI
f
t ]. We let zjt denote the rational expectation (the best
estimate) of z given the central-bank information in period t.W e l e t It denote central-bank
information in period t,s ozjt  E[zjIt]. The information is further specied below.









5 + Ciit; (2.2)
where C and Ci are matrices of appropriate dimension. We then let the quadratic form
Lt = Y 0
tWYt (2.3)
be the central bank's period loss function, where W is a positive-semidenite weighting matrix.









5 + vt; (2.4)
5 In [12], we also allow the structural equations (2.1) that determine Xt and xt to also include general linear
terms involving the estimates Xtjt and xtjt of the state of the economy based on partial information (of a kind
specied below). However, the presence of such terms makes less sense when (as here) we assume that only
the central bank has partial information. Equations (2.1) indicate how the state variables are determined by
private-sector behavior given the central bank's instrument settings it, and the beliefs of the central bank (as
opposed to those of the private sector) are not obviously relevant. Similar methods to those expounded here can
be employed even in the presence of the additional terms, but at the cost of additional algebraic complexity.
4where vt, the vector of noise, is iid with mean zero and covariance matrix vv. Central-bank
information It in period t is given by
It = fZ;  t; A;B;C;Ci;D; ~ E;W;;uu;vvg; (2.5)
where  (0 <<1) is a discount factor (to be introduced below). This incorporates the
case when some or all of the predetermined and forward-looking variables are observable by the
central bank. The full information I
f
t in period t, the private-sector information set, is given by
I
f
t = fX;x ;i ;  t; A;B;C;Ci;D; ~ E;W;;uu;vvg: (2.6)
Thus, we here assume that the central bank has the same or less information than the private
sector. The special case where both the central bank and the private sector have the same
partial information is treated in Svensson and Woodford [12].6
2.2 Certainty equivalence
In the present section, we assume that there is no commitment mechanism, so the central bank
acts under discretion. Assume that central bank each period, conditional on the information It,





Svensson and Woodford [12, appendix A] show that certainty-equivalence applies for the
central bank's optimization when the central bank and the private sector has the same informa-
tion. The same proof goes through in the present case of asymmetric information. Thus, the
equilibrium under discretion will be characterized by the instrument being a linear function of
the current estimate of the predetermined variables,
it = FXtjt: (2.8)
Furthermore, the estimate of the forward-looking variables will fulll
xtjt = GXtjt; (2.9)
6 Note that the predetermined and forward-looking variables can be interpreted as deviations from uncondi-
tional means and the target variables can be interpreted as deviations from constant target levels. More generally,
constants, non-zero unconditional means and non-zero target levels can be incorporated by including unity among
the predetermined variables, for instance, as the last element of Xt. The last row of the relevant matrices will
then include the corresponding constants/means/target levels.
5where the matrix G by [12, appendix A] fullls
G =( A22 − ~ EGA12)−1[−A21 + ~ EGA11 +(~ EGB1 − B2)F]; (2.10)


















and we assume that the matrix A22 − ~ EGA12 is invertible. The matrices F and G depend on
A, B, C, Ci, ~ E, W and , but (because of certainty equivalence) not on D1, D2, uu and vv.
2.3 Failure of the separation principle
We can show that the forward-looking variables evolve according to a relation of the form
xt = G1Xt +( G − G1)Xtjt; (2.11)
where the matrix G1 remains to be determined. In the case of symmetric information, [12] shows




and hence depends only on A1 (A1
22 is assumed to be invertible). We will see that in the present
case of asymmetric information, G1 is determined in a more complex way. In particular, it is no
longer generally independent of the specication of the central bank's partial information.
For a given G1, it follows from (2.1), (2.4), (2.8) and (2.11) that the dynamics for Xt and Zt
follow
Xt+1 = HXt + JXtjt + ut+1; (2.13)
Zt = LXt + MXtjt + vt; (2.14)
where
H  A11 + A12G1; (2.15)
J  B1F + A12(G − G1); (2.16)
L  D1 + D2G1; (2.17)
M  D2(G − G1); (2.18)
6and where D  [D1 D2] is decomposed according to Xt and xt. (Note that the matrix L in
(2.17) should not be confused with the period loss function Lt in (2.3).)
We note that, as in the symmetric-information case, the problem of estimating the predeter-
mined variables has been transformed to a problem without forward-looking variables, with the
transition equation (2.13) and the measurement equation (2.14); once again, the only nonstan-
dard feature of this ltering problem is the circularity implied by the appearance of Xtjt on the
right-hand side of the measurement equation. Thus, as discussed in [12], with forward-looking
variables among the observable variables, there is a simultaneity problem because the forward-
looking variables depend on the current estimate of the predetermined variables and the latter
depend on the observables.
Temporarily ignoring the simultaneity problem, the optimal estimate of Xt+1 will be given
by a Kalman lter updating equation,
Xt+1jt+1 = Xt+1jt + K(Zt+1 − LXt+1jt − MXt+1jt+1); (2.19)
where the Kalman gain matrix K remains to be determined. The updating equation can, given
(2.14), be written
Xt+1jt+1 = Xt+1jt + K[L(Xt+1 − Xt+1jt)+vt+1]: (2.20)
The Kalman gain matrix is given by
K = PL0(LPL0 + vv)−1; (2.21)
where the matrix P  Cov[Xt+1 − Xt+1jt] is the covariance matrix for the prediction errors
Xt+1 − Xt+1jt and satises
P = H[P − PL0(LPL0 + vv)−1LP]H0 + uu: (2.22)
Thus for given G1 and hence given H and L, P can be solved from (2.22), either numerically
or analytically, depending upon the complexity of the matrices H, L and uu.T h e nK is given
by (2.21).
The simultaneity in (2.19) means that the updating equation is not operational. Solving
(2.19) for Xt+1jt+1 eliminates the simultaneity and results in
Xt+1jt+1 =( I + KM)−1[(I − KL)Xt+1jt + KZt+1]
(I + KM)−1[(I − KL)(H + J)Xtjt + KZt+1]; (2.23)
7where we have used the fact that by (2.13) the prediction equation will be
Xt+1jt =( H + J)Xtjt: (2.24)
Equation (2.23) is an operational recursive updating equation, which avoids the simultaneity
problem and uses the current observable variables to update the previous estimate Xtjt.
It only remains to determine G1. Assuming a solution of the form (2.11), we must have
~ EEtxt+1 = ~ EG1EtXt+1 + ~ E(G − G1)EtXt+1jt+1: (2.25)
We would like to express the right-hand side as a function of Xt, xt and Xtjt: W ec a nt h e ne q u a t e
this with the second block of (2.1),
~ EEtxt+1 = A21Xt + A22xt + B2FXtjt (2.26)
(where we have used (2.9), solve for xt as a function of Xt and Xtjt, and identify G1.
We note that, by (2.13) and (2.20), we have
EtXt+1 = HXt + JXtjt
EtXt+1jt+1 = Xt+1jt + KL(EtXt+1 − Xt+1jt)
=( H + J)Xtjt + KLH(Xt − Xtjt):
Substituting this into (2.25), we obtain
~ EEtxt+1 = ~ EG1(HXt + JXtjt)+ ~ E(G − G1)[(H + J)Xtjt + KLH(Xt − Xtjt)]
= ~ E[G1 +( G − G1)KL]H(Xt − Xtjt)+ ~ EG(H + J)Xtjt: (2.27)
Equating this with (2.26) and solving for xt; we obtain a solution of the form (2.11), where G1
must satisfy
G1 = A−1
22 f−A21 +[ G1 +( G − G1)KL]Hg: (2.28)
Thus, in contrast to (2.12) for the case where the private sector and central bank have the
same information, the matrix G1 now depends not only on A but on KL as well. Thus G1, H,
L, K and P are all simultaneously determined, by the equations (2.28), (2.15), (2.17), (2.21)
and (2.22). In particular, since K and P depend on uu and vv,s od ot h eo t h e rm a t r i c e s .
In the special case when D2 = 0, that is, when none of the observable variables depend
directly on any forward-looking variables, L is by (2.17) independent of G1 and hence of K.T h e
8other matrices are then still simultaneously determined. Recall that F and G only depend on
A, B, C, Ci, W and , and not on D, K or L, and hence not on uu and vv.
In the case when the private sector has the same information as the central bank, the terms
that are multiplied with the factor G1 +( G − G1)KL all vanish in (2.27) (since EtXt − Xtjt =
Xtjt −Xtjt = 0). As a consequence, the terms multiplying that same factor in (2.28) vanish, and
(2.28) reduces to (2.12) as in [12].
Thus, in the asymmetric-information case considered here, where the private-sector has full
information and the central bank has partial information, certainty-equivalence still applies for
the central bank's optimization problem, in the sense that the implied reaction function and
response F to its estimate of the predetermined variables is independent of the variance of the
shocks, uu, and the information structure of the economy, D1, D2 and vv. However, the
separation principle does not apply in the way that it does in the symmetric-information case.
The estimation is now more complex and, in particular, it is not independent of the central
bank's objective and its choice of F. (Note that G1 by (2.28) depends on G, which depends on
F and hence C, Ci, W and .)
3 Optimal policy with commitment
Again we assume the model (2.1), in which the private sector has full information, but now
suppose instead that the central bank commits itself to an optimal plan for the indenite future
at information set I0 in period 0. As in the case of symmetric partial information treated in
[12], the optimal commitment can be derived using a Lagrangian approach to what is essentially
a planning problem in which the structural equations (2.1) are constraints. In the present

















where in each period t, '1t and '2t are vectors of Lagrange multipliers conformable to Xt and
xt respectively. The multipliers '1;t+1 and '2;t+1 indicate the value of relaxing the constraints
represented by the rst and second rows of (2.1) respectively; the term −ut+1 has been suppressed
inside the rst set of square brackets as it is irrelevant for the rst-order conditions derived below.
Because the second row of (2.1) represents a set of equilibrium conditions for the determination
9of xt as a function of information in I
f
t (rather than for the determination of xt+1 as a function
of later information), the multipliers '2;t+1 are in fact measurable with respect to (that is,
depend only on) the period t information set I
f
t , whereas the multipliers '1;t+1 are measurable
with respect to I
f
t+1. (The notation '2;t+1 rather than '2t is nonetheless convenient in writing
expressions such as (3.1) below.) The nal term on the right-hand side corresponds to the
constraint imposed by the vector of initial conditions X0:
3.1 Certainty equivalence







































We have added a term −−1'0
20x0 to the terms inside the square brackets, for the sake of
symmetry in notation, but now correspondingly stipulate the initial condition
'20 =0 :
(Note that these Lagrange multipliers do not correspond to any actual constraint upon the
planning problem.) This should be interpreted as an initial condition for each possible state in
period zero consistent with the information set I0, rather than a single initial condition for I0.
Dierentiation of (3.1) with respect to yt and it then yields the rst-order conditions
A0Et't+1 + Lyyyt + Lyiit − −1~ I0't =0 ; (3.2)
B0't+1jt + Liyytjt + Liiit =0 ; (3.3)
where the matrices Ljk represent second partial derivatives of the period loss function. Note
















































7 Here we use the fact that E['2;t+1Etxt+1 j I0]=E [ E t'2;t+1xt+1 j I0]=E [ '2;t+1xt+1 j I0]; by the law of
iterated expectations.
10so that the Ljk are matrices of constant coecients, that depend only upon the elements of the
matrices C;Ci; and W:
Assuming that Lii is of full rank,8 we can solve (3.3) for it, obtaining
it = −L−1
ii Liyytjt − L−1
ii B0't+1jt: (3.5)
Substituting (3.5) into (2.1) and (3.2) to eliminate it, and taking the conditional expectation
of both equations with respect to It; we then obtain a system of equations for the expected






































V − Lyy + LyiL−1
ii Liy:
Here it is worth noting that U and V are symmetric matrices.
Let us assume furthermore that the square matrix on the left-hand side of (3.6) is of full

















We then wish to consider solutions to (3.7) that are consistent with given initial values for Xtjt
and '2;tjt: We note that the number of variables in (3.7) is 2(nX + nx), where nX and nx is the
dimension of Xt and xt, respectively, and that there are nX + nx initial conditions (Xtjt and
'2;tjt). We shall restrict our attention to bounded solutions, by which we mean solutions in which
for any t; yt+jjt and 't+jjt satisfy a uniform bound for all j. Such solutions necessarily satisfy
the transversality condition for an optimal plan, and since our equations (2.1){(2.4) will usually
represent only a local approximation to the true structural equations and true loss function,
unbounded solutions need not correspond at all closely to solutions to the true equations.
As usual (and ignoring non-generic cases), there is a unique bounded solution to (3.7) con-
sistent with the initial conditions if the number of eigenvalues of M inside the unit circle (that
8 The case in which Ci =0 ; with the consequence that Lii =0 ; can be treated using similar methods, as shown
in appendix A.
11is, with modulus less than one) is exactly equal to the number of initial conditions, nX + nx.





V −1~ I0 − R0
R − ~ I −U
3
7
5 =0 : (3.8)
Multiplication of the right blocks of this matrix by −−1; then multiplication of the lower blocks
by −−1−1; and nally transposition of the matrix does not change the sign of its determinant.





V −1~ I0 − −1−1R0




Comparison of this with (3.8) shows that if  is a root, −1−1 must also be. It follows that M
has as many eigenvalues with jj > 1 p
 as with jj < 1 p
. Thus, since 1 p
 > 1, at most half of
the eigenvalues (that is, at most nX + nx) are inside the unit circle (that is, with jj < 1), so
there is no possibility of multiple stationary solutions to (3.7). If  is close to 1 (as will often
be the case), there are likely to be exactly half inside the unit circle. We shall assume this
condition from now on.9 Then (3.7) has a unique bounded solution in which yt+jjt and 't+jjt
can be expressed as linear functions of the initial conditions Xtjt and '2;tjt; for arbitrary j  0:
Substitution of this solution into (3.5) implies evolution of the instrument according to a
relation of the form
it = FXtjt +  t−1jt; (3.9)
where F and  are matrices of constant coecients, and we now introduce the notation t−1 
'2t for the sub-vector of Lagrange multipliers that are predetermined state variables under our
characterization of the optimal commitment, just as in the symmetric-information case treated
in [12]. (We change the time subscript to emphasize that the elements of t−1 are determined
at date t − 1.) Similarly, the conditional expectations of the forward-looking variables evolve
a c c o r d i n gt oar e l a t i o no ft h ef o r m
xtjt = GXtjt +Γ  t−1jt; (3.10)
9 In the case of an exact linear-quadratic model, as opposed to a mere local approximation to a nonlinear
model, this condition is not necessary in order for us to identify the unique relevant solution to (3.7), as the
unique solution that does not explode fast enough to violate the transversality condition. But in practice we are
not likely to deal with models that we can regard as exact, and instead assume that the optimal plan happens to
be stationary. In this case, the eigenvalue condition assumed in the text must hold, as there would otherwise be
no stationary solution.
12while the conditional expectations of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the forward-
looking variables evolve according to
tjt = SXtjt +  t−1jt; (3.11)
where G;Γ;S; are further matrices of constant coecients. Substitution of these solutions
into (2.1) then implies that the conditional expectations of the predetermined variables evolve
according to
Xt+1jt =( H + J)Xtjt +Ψ  t−1jt; (3.12)
where H and J are again dened as in (2.15){(2.16), and
Ψ  A12Γ+B1: (3.13)
These equations completely dene the conditional expectations of both the state variables
and the central bank's instrument settings at all future dates, as functions of the current es-
timates of the predetermined states Xtjt and t−1jt: We note that all of the matrices F, ,
G,Γ ,S, ,H + J, and Ψ are exactly the same as in the case of the optimal plan with full
information (and are independent of the matrices D and vv that dene the partial information
of the central bank); they are furthermore the same as in the case where there is no uncertainty
at all (and independent of the matrix uu dening the fundamental uncertainty). This is the
sense in which the optimal commitment here continues to conform to the principle of certainty
equivalence.
The system of equations (3.9){(3.12) are also exactly the same as those that characterize
the optimal commitment in the case of symmetric (though incomplete) information on the part
of the central bank and the private sector, as shown in [12]. The only dierence is that in the
symmetric case, the Lagrange multipliers associated with the forward-looking variables satisfy
t−1jt = t−1jt−1 = t−1; so that equations (3.9){(3.12) can be written in terms of the multipliers
themselves rather than their conditional expectations, while this is not generally true when the
central bank has less information. (We show below that in general t−1 depends on information
not possessed by the central bank at date t − 1.)
3.2 Failure of the separation principle
In the case of symmetric information, we can also take the second row of (2.1), subtract each
term from its expectation conditional upon It, and obtain a set of nx linear relations between
13xt − xtjt and Xt − Xtjt that must hold at all times. (The derivation of these relations depends
upon the fact that the Etxt+1 term in the second row of (2.1) is instead replaced by xt+1jt when
the private sector has the same incomplete information as the central bank.) These relations
can be solved for xt, yielding (when (3.10) is used as well) a solution for xt as a linear function
of Xt;X tjt; and t−1: Substituting this in turn into the rst row of (2.1), one is able to solve
for the complete dynamics of the state variables (and not merely their expectations conditional
upon the central bank's information) and of the Lagrange multipliers given the evolution of the
estimates Xtjt; with coecients that are independent of the nature of the partial information.
This is an aspect of the separation principle that can be shown to hold in the case of symmetric
incomplete information, just as in the case of full information. However, that derivation (detailed
in [13]) cannot be applied here, given that Etxt+1 must be distinguished from xt+1jt:
However, the second row of (2.1) does imply that
~ I(Etyt+1 − yt+1jt)=A^ yt; (3.14)
where ^ yt  yt − ytjt. (Here we use the fact that it must be measurable with respect to It.)
Similarly, (3.2) implies that
A0(Et't+1 − 't+1jt)=−1 ~ I0^ 't − Lyy^ yt; (3.15)



















































In order to solve (3.16) for the dynamics of ^ yt and ^ 't, we must specify how the central
bank's conditional expectations are updated (for instance, how yt+1jt+1 relates to yt+1jt): Let us
















5 + ~ K[ L(  Xt+1 −  Xt+1jt)+vt+1]; (3.17)
where









14where ~ K and  L are matrices that have yet to be identied. (We show below that the Kalman

















5 + ~ K L






























5 + ~ K L

Et  Xt+1 −  Xt+1jt

: (3.19)
Let  I be the submatrix of the identity matrix that selects the elements


































where we assume that I − ~ K L I is invertible. Substituting (3.20) into (3.16) results in

















Again, we are interested in bounded solutions of (3.21) consistent with given initial values
for ^ Xt and ^ t−1: We assume the appropriate conguration of eigenvalues of the system. There
is then a unique bounded solution of the form
^ xt =  G1(  Xt −  Xtjt); (3.22)
^ t =  S1(  Xt −  Xtjt); (3.23)
where as usual the matrices  G1  [G1 Γ1]a n d S1  [S1 1] can be derived from the eigenvectors
of the system (3.21).
Combining (3.10) with (3.22), we nd that
xt =  G1  Xt +( G −  G1)  Xtjt; (3.24)
15where  G  [G Γ], and the matrices G and Γ are the ones that appear in (3.10). This equation is
similar in form to the solution obtained in the case of symmetric partial information (discussed
above), except that it includes separate terms in t−1 and t−1jt (which now dier), and that the
matrix G1 no longer takes the simple form (2.12). In particular, the matrix G1 (and similarly
Γ1; which matters when t−1 6= t−1jt) depends in general upon the elements of the Kalman
gain matrix  K; and so is no longer independent of the nature of the central bank's partial
information.
A complete solution for the dynamics of the state variables also now requires that we solve for
the dynamics of the multipliers t; which are no longer fully characterized by (3.11). Combining
(3.11) and (3.22), we nd that
t =  S1  Xt +( S −  S1)  Xtjt; (3.25)
where  S  [S ], and S and  are the matrices appearing in (3.11). It is the fact that  S1 is
generally non-zero in this derivation that implies that t is no longer measurable with respect
to It: Unless all elements of Xt are part of the central bank's information set at date t +1 ; t
will generally not be measurable with respect to It+1; either.
It remains to determine the evolution of the estimates  Xtjt: We note that in the present
case (unlike that of symmetric partial information) it is necessary to derive a Kalman lter for
the evolution of the estimates t−1jt as well as for the estimates Xtjt: Substitution of (3.9) and
(3.24) into the rst row of (2.1), combination with (3.25), and substitution into (2.4) leads to
the transition equation for  Xt,
 Xt+1 =  H  Xt +  J  Xtjt + ut+1; (3.26)
and to the measurement equation















S − S1  − 1
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5;  L  [L 1];  M  [M 2];
(3.28)
H;J;L;M are again dened as in (2.15){(2.18), and
Ψ1 = A12Γ1; Ψ2  A12(Γ − Γ1)+B1; 1  D2Γ1; 2  D2(Γ − Γ1):
16Note that Ψ  Ψ1+Ψ2 is the same matrix as in (3.12), so that (3.26) is consistent with (though
not implied by) equations (3.11) and (3.12) for the evolution of the conditional expectations.
The system of equations consisting of (3.26) then represents a system of transition equations
with a form analogous to (2.13), in which the state vector Xt is replaced by the vector  Xt that
includes the elements of both Xt and t−1: Equation (3.27) is similarly a measurement equation
with a form analogous to (2.14). It follows that the optimal estimates of Xt and t−1 will be
given by a Kalman lter analogous to (2.20). We thus obtain updating equations for Xt and
t−1 of the form indicated by the corresponding rows of (3.17),
 Xt+1jt+1 =  Xt+1jt +  K[ L(  Xt+1 −  Xt+1jt)+vt+1]; (3.29)
where  K   I ~ K.
Using (3.26) to form the forecast  Xt+1jt; (3.29) may be written
 Xt+1jt+1 =( I −  K L)(  H +  J)  Xtjt +  K( L  Xt+1 + vt+1): (3.30)
For a given Kalman gain matrix  K, a complete system of equations for the evolution of the
endogenous variables is then given by (3.24), (3.26) and (3.30), which apply in each period t  0;
starting from given initial values for X0 and X0j0, and from the initial values −1 = −1j0 =0 .
It remains to determine the Kalman gain matrix in (3.29). Making use of the analogy
between equations (3.26){(3.29) and (2.13), (2.14) and (2.20), we directly nd that the Kalman
gain matrix is given by the equation
 K =  P  L0( L  P  L0 + vv)−1; (3.31)
analogous to (2.21), where the matrix  P  Cov[  Xt −  Xtjt−1] is the covariance matrix for the
prediction errors  Xt −  Xtjt−1.T h em a t r i x P in turn satises the Riccati equation
 P =  H[  P −  P  L0( L  P  L0 + vv)−1 L  P]  H0 +  uu (3.32)










These equations are considerably more complicated to solve than in the case of symmetric
partial information, treated in Svensson and Woodford [12]. First of all, the matrices  K and
 P are larger (of dimension (nX + nx)  (nX + nx) rather than simply nX  nX). But more
17importantly, the elements of the matrices  H and  L that appear in (3.28) do not depend solely
upon the elements of A and D, as in the case of symmetric information. For the matrix G1
appearing in the denitions of H and L is no longer given by (2.12), but instead depends upon
the matrices of the system (3.21) and hence on the Kalman gain matrix ~ K (though we show
below that it only depends on  K). The same is true of the matrices Γ1, S1 and 1 that enter
into  H. Thus, one must solve a system of simultaneous equations for  P,  K, and the matrices
that dene the solution to (3.21); a separation principle no longer holds. This simultaneity is the
same as we found in section 2, except that now the matrices involved are all of larger dimension.
The denitions of the matrices in (3.21) refer not only to  K but also to the other elements
of the Kalman gain matrix ~ K. These, however, are easily expressed as functions of  K.L e tu s

































Then by (3.10) the Kalman gain matrix for the forward-looking variables, xt,i sg i v e nb y
~ Kx =  G  K:
Similarly, the unique bounded solution to (3.7) allows us to write '1tjt as a matrix times  Xtjt,
where the matrix is the same as in the case of full information (or certainty). This equation
implies that the Kalman gain matrix for the prediction equation for '1t, ~ K'1, will be the same
matrix times  K: Thus the only simultaneity that must be dealt with is the dependence of the
matrices G1;Γ1, S1 and 1 upon  K.
4 Application: Optimal monetary policy with real-time data
As an example of an application of our results, we sketch here the analysis of Aoki [1] and [2]
of the way in which optimal monetary policy should make use of the preliminary estimates of
current macroeconomic conditions that are available in real time. As Orphanides [8] in particular
has stressed, policy must be made on the basis of preliminary estimates that are in fact revised
18substantially in subsequent months. Aoki models this by assuming that the available measures
of current inﬂation and output are subject to measurement error, while the true values come to
be known with a delay. The question that he considers is how the degree of uncertainty about
the current state should aect the degree to which policy responds to the available real-time
measures. Here we indicate how Aoki's analysis could be cast in terms of our framework.
Aoki assumes that output yt and inﬂation t are determined by a model consisting of two
structural equations,
yt = Etyt+1 − [it − Ett+1 − t]; (4.1)
t = (yt − yn
t )+Ett+1; (4.2)
which can be interpreted as an intertemporal \IS equation" and \aggregate supply equation"
respectively. Here the short-term nominal interest rate it is assumed to be the central bank's
policy instrument. The dependence of both relations upon expectations regarding future output
and inﬂation introduces the forward-looking elements into the model's structural relation that
complicates the central bank's optimal ltering and control problems.10 Note that the expecta-
tions in these relations are conditional upon the full information set of the private sector.
The exogenous disturbances t and yn
t are assumed to evolve as rst-order autoregressive
processes,
t = t−1 + et; (4.3)
yn
t = yn
t−1 + eyt; (4.4)
where 0 < ;<1 and the disturbances et;e yt are i.i.d. mean-zero normal random variables,
with variance s2
 and s2
y respectively. The central bank is assumed to wish to minimize a
discounted loss function (2.7), where the period loss function is of the form
Lt = 2
t + a(y − yn
t )2; (4.5)
for a certain weight a>0: This is a standard specication of \ﬂexible inﬂation targeting" (see
Svensson [11]), and can also be justied as a utility-based welfare criterion given the individual
decision problems underlying relations (4.1){(4.2) (see Woodford [18]).
Because the \natural rate of output" around which one wishes to stabilize output according
to (4.5) is exactly the shift factor in the aggregate supply relation (4.2), the aggregate supply
10 See Woodford [17] for the derivation of these relations from the underlying decision problems of households
and rms, and for further discussion of the model.
19relation itself implies no conﬂict between the goals of inﬂation and output-gap stabilization. It
is possible in principle to completely stabilize both target variables, since t =0a n dyt = yn
t at
all times is consistent with equation (4.2), and also with equation (4.1) as long as the nominal
interest rate satises
it = rn





That is, complete stabilization of both target variables is a possible equilibrium, as long as
the interest rate it perfectly tracks the exogenous variation in the Wicksellian \natural rate of
interest" rn
t (discussed further in Woodford [17]). Under full information on the part of the
central bank, this would represent optimal policy, as this equilibrium achieves the theoretical
minimum value of the loss function (zero each period).11 However, the central bank's real-time
information set may not allow it to estimate the current natural rate of interest with complete
accuracy. In this case, complete stabilization is not feasible, and the central bank faces a tradeo
between the two goals of greater inﬂation or greater output-gap stabilization.
Aoki assumes that the central bank's information set when setting it consists of complete
information about all state variables known to the private sector at date t − 1, plus noisy
preliminary estimates of current inﬂation and output. These preliminary estimates are assumed
to be given by
o
t = t + "t; (4.7)
yo
t = yt + "yt; (4.8)
where the measurement-error terms "t and "yt are i.i.d. mean-zero normal random variables,
with variance 2
 and 2
y respectively. These errors in the central bank's preliminary estimates
are assumed to be distributed independently of the \fundamental" disturbances et and eyt.
Aoki's model falls within the general framework set out in the previous sections. The struc-
tural equations (4.1){(4.2), together with laws of motion (4.3){(4.4) for the disturbances, com-
prise a model of the form (2.1). Here the predetermined/exogenous state variables consist of a
2-vector of exogenous disturbances X
t and the non-predetermined endogenous variables consist
11 That is, an optimal policy would bring about an equilibrium in which the nominal interest rate would
vary in this way. This does not necessarily mean that the optimal policy is for the central bank to set its
instrument according to the function (4.6) of the exogenous disturbances; for while such a policy rule would be
consistent with the optimal equilibrium, it would also allow an extremely large class of other rational-expectations
equilibria as well, which equilibria are less desirable. Other rules, that specify feedback from inﬂation and output-
gap outcomes as under the \Taylor rule", are equally consistent with the optimal equilibrium and can render
equilibrium determinate as well (see Woodford [17]). There is no uniquely optimal rule of this form, since rules
that dier in the way that they specify out-of-equilibrium behavior may imply the same set of equilibria.




















and it is possible to write equations (4.1){(4.2) in a form such that ~ E = I: While it would be
possible to write the model's equations in the form (2.1) with Xt = X
t ; this notation would
not allow us to express the central bank's period t observables as a function of Xt, xt and
measurement error alone, as assumed in (2.4). In order to directly apply our above expressions
for the optimal ltering problem, it is necessary to augment the state vector to include lagged












The system (2.1) then becomes a system of six dierence equations, including two identities.



















Because Ci =0 ; we must apply the approach described in appendix A rather than the one
followed in the text, but we are still able to derive a system of rst-order conditions for optimal
policy of the form (3.7).













































t and "t are the 2-vectors of the observations, [o
t yo
t]0, and measurement errors, ["t "yt]0,
respectively. Under this specication, the central bank's information set at date t includes the
entire history fX
t−jg for j  1; and so a complete description of the state of the world as of
date t − 1, but only the information about date t fundamentals that is contained in the noisy
measurements of current inﬂation and output (the two elements of Z
t ). Aoki assumes, as we
do, complete information on the part of the private sector.
Our results in sections 2 and 3 can then be directly applied. Discretionary optimization by
the central bank (treated by Aoki in [1]) results in the interest rate satisfying a relation of the
21form (2.8). Furthermore, the matrix F in this relation is the same as under full information.
This allows us to write the relation in the simpler form
it = f0X
tjt;
since the state variables X
t−1 may be omitted from the vector Xt in the case of full information.
Furthermore, the corresponding relation in the full-information case is given by (4.6), allowing




A Kalman lter can then be used to describe the evolution of the central bank's optimal estimate
of the current natural rate of interest.
Under an optimal commitment (treated by Aoki in [2]), instead, the interest rate satises a
more complex relation of the form
it = f0X
tjt + 0t−1: (4.10)
(This similarly follows from (3.9), given that the elements X
t−1 of the state vector Xt are
irrelevant in the case of full information, and that t−1jt = t−1 under Aoki's information
structure.) Once again, the vectors f0 and 0 are the same as in the case of full information.
Since the optimal equilibrium under full information satises (4.6),12 the vector f0 is the same
as in the case of discretionary optimization, and (4.10) may equivalently be written
it = rn
tjt + 0t−1: (4.11)
Note that it would not be correct to argue on the basis of certainty equivalence that since
it = rn
t is the optimal commitment under full information, the optimal rule with incomplete
information will satisfy it = rn
tjt: The reason that the optimal commitment (4.6) can be written
without any feedback from a Lagrange multiplier in the case of full information is not because
0 = 0 for this model, but rather because t−1 = 0 at all times. This is because under full
information, complete stabilization of the target variables is feasible, and so there is no gain
from relaxing the constraints imposed by the model's structural equations. But one can show
(by computing the relevant eigenvectors of the matrix M in (3.7)) that 0 6=0 ; so that the
second term on the right-hand side of (4.11) cannot be omitted. Nor is it true that t−1 is
12 Note that in the case of full information, (4.6) describes the result of central-bank optimization under either
discretion or commitment|the optimal commitment happens in this case to be time-consistent.
22zero most of the time, in the case of imperfect information on the part of the central bank.
This is because when information is imperfect, it will generally not be possible for the central
bank to adjust its interest-rate instrument (which must depend only upon the central bank's
information) so as to perfectly track variations in the natural rate of interest, and so perfect
stabilization will be unattainable. In this case, there will generally be non-zero state-contingent
Lagrange multipliers associated with perturbations of the constraints implied by the structural
equations (4.1){(4.2).
This does not contradict our certainty-equivalence results above, because these do not imply
that the law of motion for the Lagrange multipliers must be the same as in the case of full
information. It is true that (3.11) must hold, with the same matrices S and  as in the case
of full information. In the case of full information, we know that S =0 ,s i n c e t will be zero
regardless of the realization of the exogenous disturbances Xt. Thus (3.11) reduces in Aoki's
model to
tjt =  t−1jt =  t−1; (4.12)
for a certain matrix . However,  is not a zero matrix. In the case of full information, the
corresponding law of motion
t =  t−1
implies that t =0f o ra l lt as a result of the initial condition −1 =0 ; despite the fact that
 6=0 : But with incomplete information, the initial condition −1 = 0 no longer implies that
t = 0 as well at all later dates. Instead, it implies only that tj0 =0f o ra l lt  0. The actual
value of the Lagrange multiplier will be given by the law of motion
t = S1[Xt − Xtjt]+  t−1;
where S1 6=0 : Thus (4.11) makes it a function not only of the central bank's period-t estimate of
the current state, but also of what it has learned by period t about its past errors in estimation
of the economy's state.
Specically, Aoki [2] shows that the optimal commitment involves making interest rates
higher than the current estimate of the natural rate if the bank now knows that it underestimated
the natural rate in the past. The reason is that the private sector is aware of the bank's
misperception, and if it understands that the bank will later correct its error, then even when
the current short rate is below the natural rate, the private sector's expectation of higher future
short rates will dampen the high demand (and hence inﬂationary pressure) that would otherwise
23result. Of course, the cost of fullling such a commitment later is a short-term interest rate that
deviates to a greater extent from the natural rate at that time; but some use of this mechanism
can nonetheless improve the bank's overall stabilization objectives. Optimal policy is thus
not purely forward-looking, in the sense discussed in Woodford [16]. Indeed, the response of
the bank's interest-rate instrument to ﬂuctuations in the natural rate of interest will be more
inertial than is the natural rate itself, just as in the analysis of Woodford [15]. In the case of a
positive innovation in the natural rate, the average immediate increase in the nominal interest
rate will be smaller, because of the bank's inability to identify the increase immediately given its
imperfect observation of current conditions. At the same time, the increase in interest rates will
last longer, because in later periods the central bank will respond to its initial underestimate
of the natural rate by keeping interest rates higher than the natural rate at those later times.
Interestingly, Aoki obtains these results in the case of asymmetric information without any need
for the assumption of an interest-rate stabilization objective in the central bank's loss function,
relied upon in the full-information analysis of Woodford [15].
24A Appendix: The case of a loss function independent of the instruments
Here we consider the extension of our results to the special case in which Ci =0 ; so that the
policymaker's objective function is independent of the path of the instruments it: In this case,
Lii =0 ; so that the matrix is necessarily not invertible, as assumed in the text. In this case,
we cannot solve (3.3) for it: However, in this case we also must have Liy = 0; hence there is no
need to solve (3.3) in order to eliminate it from (3.2), as the equation is already in the desired
form. We can simply take the conditional expectation of (3.2) with respect to It and obtain
A0't+1jt = −Lyyytjt + −1~ I0'tjt; (A.1)
which is of the same form as the upper half of the system of equations (3.6). The sticking point
is that we are unable to eliminate it from (2.1), as is also necessary in order to derive the system
(3.6) in the text.
It is nonetheless possible to derive a system of dierence equations of the same general form.
We note that in the present case, (3.3) reduces to
B0't+1jt =0 : (A.2)
This is a set of restrictions of the same form as those in the system (3.6), and independent of
(3.2). Let us suppose that B is of full rank;13 then (A.2) is a system of ni linearly independent
restrictions, where ni is the number of instruments. Let g be an (nX + nx)  (nX + nx − ni)
matrix, the columns of which all linearly independent of one another, and orthogonal to each of
the columns of B (so that g0B = 0). Then premultiplying (2.1) by g0 and taking the conditional
expectation with respect to It,w eo b t a i n
g0~ Iyt+1jt = g0Aytjt: (A.3)
This provides an additional nX +nx−ni linearly independent restrictions, and equations (A.1),
(A.2) and (A.3) jointly comprise a system of the form (3.6). In the generic case, the matrix on
the left-hand side will be invertible as assumed in the text, and one will obtain a system of the
form (3.7).
13 This is purely a notational convenience, as our method here can be applied even when it is not. One simply
must eliminate redundant equations from (A.2), and augment the number of columns in the matrix g accordingly.
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